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Abstract 
Brandstätter, Gigerenzer and Hertwig (2006) put forward the priority heuristic (PH) as a fast and 
frugal heuristic for decisions under risk. According to the PH, individuals do not make trade-offs 
between gains and probabilities, as proposed by expected utility models such as cumulative 
prospect theory (CPT), but use information in a non-compensatory manner and ignore informa-
tion. We conducted three studies to test the PH empirically by analyzing individual choice pat-
terns, decision times and information search parameters in diagnostic decision tasks. Results on 
all three dependent variables conflict with the predictions of the PH and can be better explained 
by the CPT. The predictive accuracy of the PH was high for decision tasks in which the predic-
tions align with the predictions of the CPT but very low for decision tasks in which this was not 
the case. The findings indicate that earlier results supporting the PH might have been caused by 
the selection of decision tasks that were not diagnostic for the PH as compared to CPT.  
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Many everyday decisions have to be made under risk. Different options lead to outcomes that 
have different values and are realized with different probabilities. Such decision tasks can be 
conceptualized as choices between gambles (or prospects). A gamble (x1, p1; … ; xn, pn) leads to 
outcomes xi with a probability of pi. The probabilities pi add up to 1, which means that all possi-
ble outcomes of the gamble are specified. One of the most fundamental assumptions in decision 
research is that individuals integrate outcomes and probabilities in a compensatory way and se-
lect the option with the highest weighted sum (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947; Edwards, 
1954; Savage, 1954). In this tradition the (cumulative) prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) postulates that the expected utility V (“value”) of gambles 
can be calculated by: 
) ( ) ( i
i
i x v p V ∑ = π , 
where the weighting function π(pi) is an inverse S-shaped function of the probabilities pi and the 
value function v(xi) is an S-shaped function of the outcomes xi. The cumulative prospect theory 
(CPT) proposes specific mathematical equations for both functions.
1 
Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006) have recently argued that under certain conditions 
individuals use simple non-compensatory strategies (cf. Fishburn, 1974) instead of integrating 
information in a weighted compensatory manner, as advocated by CPT.  These authors proposed 
the priority heuristic (PH) as an alternative process model for risky choices. According to the PH 
individuals do not carry out calculations of expected utilities (or values) but instead compare 
pairs of outcomes and probabilities using certain difference thresholds (cf. lexicographic semi-
order; Tversky, 1969). In order to support the PH empirically, Brandstätter et al. report simula-
tions in which the PH successfully predicted choices of the majority of participants. We argue 
that this data is not conclusive evidence in favor of the PH because (a) aggregated choice data, 
instead of individual choice data, have been analyzed and (b) the simulated choice sets did not 
include sufficient diagnostic decisions that could have allowed for a differentiation between the 
PH and the CPT. We carried out three experiments that eliminated these problems by using di-
agnostic decision tasks (i.e., decision tasks in which the predictions of the PH and the CPT dif-
fer) and analyzing patterns of individual choices.  
We aim to show in this article that the proposed non-compensatory PH does not capture decision 
behavior of individuals concerning choices, decision times and information search, and that indi-
vidual choices follow a weighted compensatory integration of values and probabilities.  
                                        
1   According to the cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) the value function for non-
negative outcomes is defined by
α x x v = ) ( and the weighting function is defined by 
γ γ γ γ π
/ 1 ) ) 1 ( /( ) ( p p p p − + = . The parameter α captures the shape of the value function and the parame-
ter γ captures the shape of the weighting function. 
(1) 3 
The Priority Heuristic 
Mathematical Formalization 
The PH consists of two different process models for choices between gambles with all positive 
(or zero) outcomes (all xi ≥ 0) and choices between gambles with all negative (or zero) outcomes 
(all xi ≤ 0). The PH does not state a procedure for gambles with both positive and negative out-
comes, which structurally also underlies many everyday decisions. In this paper, choices be-
tween two gambles A and B with two outcomes each (n = 2), all of which are positive or zero, 
will be investigated. For simplicity, we use a notation in which the outcomes for each gamble are 
ordered by their values from low to high and decisions have to be made between 
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in which xMIN(A) is the minimum outcome of gamble A, pMIN(A) is the probability of the minimum 
gain, xMAX(A) is the maximum gain of gamble A, pMAX(A) is the probability of the maximum gain of 
gamble A. The same notation is used for gamble B. The expected value of the gambles can be 
computed by 
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Furthermore, XMAX is defined as the overall highest gain ) max( i MAX x X = , and the aspiration 
level XASP is defined as 1/10 of XMAX, rounded to prominent numbers (i.e., 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 
200, 500, 1000, 2000; cf. Brandstätter et al., 2006) 
⎟
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The PH specifies three rules (Brandstätter et al., 2006, p. 413): (1) Search rule (priority rule) - 
Consider information in the following order: minimum outcome (xMIN), probability of minimum 
outcome (pMIN), maximum outcome (xMAX). (2) Stopping rule - Stop the examination if the mini-
mum outcomes differ by the aspiration level XASP or more; otherwise stop if the probabilities dif-
fer by .10 or more. (3) Decision rule - Choose (in this order) the gamble with the higher mini-
mum outcome, the lower probability of the minimum outcome, or the higher maximum outcome. 
Furthermore, it is mentioned that individuals use an initial screening phase to determine whether 
the expected values of the gambles (EVA and EVB) are similar. If expected values differ substan-
tially, the PH is not applied.  
In sum, the PH postulates a non-compensatory, three-step decision strategy that can be formal-
ized as follows: 
Step 1:     Choose gamble A if  ASP B MIN A MIN X x x ≥ − ) ( ) ( , 
      choose gamble B if  ASP A MIN B MIN X x x ≥ − ) ( ) (  
      otherwise continue with step 2.  
(2) 
(3)  4
Step 2:     Choose gamble A if  10 . 0 ) ( ) ( ≥ − A MIN B MIN p p , 
      choose gamble B if  10 . 0 ) ( ) ( ≥ − B MIN A MIN p p  
      otherwise continue with step 3.  
Step 3:     Choose gamble A if  ) ( ) ( B MAX A MAX x x > , 
      choose gamble B if  ) ( ) ( A MAX B MAX x x > , 
   otherwise  [not specified]. 
The initial screening phase could be considered a further step: it is determined whether the PH 
can be applied or not. It should be noted that Brandstätter et al. (2006) specified this step only 
vaguely: "One way would be to assume that people estimate the expected values, and if the ratio 
is smaller than two, they turn to the priority heuristic… Alternatively, people may first look at 
the three (four) reasons, and if no difference is markedly larger than the others, they apply the 
priority heuristic" (p. 426). For pragmatic reasons, we will mathematically specify the first men-
tioned alternative.  
Step 0:     Screen gambles to estimate expected values and XASP, 
   i f     2
2
1
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, continue with step 1, 
   otherwise  [not specified]. 
To clarify this procedure, the PH will be explained using an example. Gamble A (€20, .80; €25, 
.20) pays €20 with a probability of .80, or €25 with a probability of .20 (EVA = €21). Gamble B 
(€8, .90; €90, .10) pays €8 with a probability of .90, or €90 with a probability of .10 (EVB = 
€16.20). An initial screening of the payoffs leads to the result that the expected values do not 
differ markedly and that the PH can be applied. In the screening phase the aspiration level (XASP) 
is determined to be €10. The decision maker would first compare the minimum outcomes of the 
alternatives (xMIN(A) = €20 and xMIN(B) = €8). The difference between these two payoffs is larger 
than the aspiration level. Thus, the inspection of further information will be stopped and the de-
cision rule will be applied. Accordingly, it is assumed that the decision maker will choose the 
gamble with the higher minimum outcome (Gamble A) and ignore the remaining information.   
As can be seen from the example, the PH is a simple heuristic. It simplifies the decision process 
by setting priorities. Probabilities and higher outcomes are neglected if the minimum outcomes 
of alternatives differ sufficiently. Processing of information primarily involves calculating dif-
ferences but never integrating probabilities and values. 
Empirical Evidence for the PH 
Brandstätter et al. (2006) show that (a) the PH may account for well-known violations of ration-
ality, (b) the PH may account for observed majority of choices (i.e., choices selected by the ma-
jority of participants) in a sample of existing data sets drawn from major publications in the field, 5 
and (c) decision times are in line with the predictions of the PH. By contrast, Johnson, Schulte-
Mecklenbeck, and Willemsen (2008) report data from process-tracing studies which indicate that 
individuals do not use the PH but instead apply compensatory integration models such as the 
CPT. In the following we will briefly discuss these findings.  
Violations of rationality. Brandstätter et al. (2006) show that in certain gambles the PH can ac-
count for major violations of rationality, such as the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953), the reflection 
effect (Fishburn & Kochenberger, 1979), the certainty effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the 
possibility effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the fourfold pattern of risk-seeking and risk-
aversion (Tversky & Fox, 1995), and intransitivity effects (Tversky, 1969). However, it should 
be noted that the reported examples do not necessarily prove that the PH can account for these 
violations in all possible gambles. Furthermore, it might be argued that other models can also 
account for most of these violations. 
More importantly, but not mentioned by Brandstätter et al. (2006), the PH allows for differential 
predictions concerning the established violation of rationality, which we will discuss using the 
certainty effect as an example. Let us consider a choice between gambles A (€10, .60; €225, .40) 
and B (€0, .40; €160, .60). According to the certainty effect (and to CPT), people should choose 
gamble A (and avoid gamble B with the zero outcome option). According to the PH, people 
should choose gamble B because expected values do not differ (step 0), differences in minimum 
outcomes do not exceed the aspiration level (step 1), but the probability of the minimum out-
come is lower in gamble B (step 2). This finding is of central importance for the current work 
because it allows us to differentiate between the CPT and the PH. The PH predicts that the cer-
tainty effect should diminish in gambles in which the differences between the minimum out-
comes are low and the €0 outcome has a lower probability than the minimum outcome of the 
other gamble. Thus, such decisions are diagnostic for the use of the PH or the CPT, in that they 
allow us to identify if one or the other strategy has been used.  
Simulations of majority choices. In a series of simulations, Brandstätter et al. (2006) compared 
the predictions of the PH and other decision strategies for a sample of existing data sets drawn 
from major publications in the field. Specifically, they tested whether model predictions con-
verge with the choice of the majority of participants. As competitors to the PH, expected utility 
models (e.g., CPT) and prominent heuristics (e.g., equal weight strategy) were selected. The re-
sults revealed that the PH predictions match the choices of the majority quite well. In 87% of the 
260 considered decision tasks, the PH correctly predicted if gamble A or B was chosen by the 
majority of participants. Thus, the hit rate of PH predictions was well above the level of chance 
(50%).  
Nonetheless, the conclusion that individuals have indeed used the PH might have been somewhat 
rushed. Most importantly, Brandstätter et al. (2006) report that up to 89% of the PH predictions 
dovetail with the predictions derived from CPT (using parameters employed by Erev et al., 2002; 
as cited in Brandstätter et al., 2006). In other words, the decision tasks used in the contests can-
not be used to identify which of the two strategies was used by the participants. Most decision   6
tasks are simply not diagnostic for the considered decision strategies. On a more general level, a 
further criticism can be levied; namely, that the PH is conceptualized as a process model for in-
dividual choice behavior, and thus it should be able to predict individual choices instead of ag-
gregated majority choices. In the analysis reported by Brandstätter et al. (2006), observed 
choices were aggregated over participants (e.g., 70% choices for gamble A) and dichotomized 
into majority choices (e.g., choice for gamble A if more than 50% of the participants choose 
gamble A). Obviously, such a data reduction makes it hard to draw sound conclusions about in-
dividual decision processes. Therefore, we re-analyzed the first data used by Brandstätter et al. 
(14 decision tasks taken from Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). First, we computed the success of 
the PH in predicting individual choices. Not surprisingly, the percentage of correct predictions 
dropped from 100% for majority choices to 77% for individual choices. This result might be par-
tially explained by the fact that people made processing errors in applying their decision strategy. 
However, a closer look at the distribution of errors revealed that the drop was not likely to be 
caused by random processing errors only. The predictive accuracy of the PH for individual 
choices differed considerably between gambles, ranging from 58% to 92%. The CPT could ex-
plain these fluctuations by individual differences in the parameters of the weighting and the 
value function. However, such systematic fluctuations in error rates could not be explained by 
the PH. 
Decision times. The PH predicts that decision time increases with the increasing numbers of 
computational steps needed to differentiate between gambles (cf. mathematical formalization) 
because in such cases more cognitive operations have to be carried out (see also Payne, Bettman, 
& Johnson, 1988). Brandstätter et al. (2006) could support this hypothesis in two experiments in 
which the number of necessary steps was systematically manipulated. However, the results 
should be interpreted with caution because, in the manipulation, other properties of the gambles 
that might also influence decision time, such as the ease of calculation and differences in the ex-
pected utilities of the gambles, have not been controlled for (cf. Cartwright, 1941; Cartwright & 
Festinger, 1943). Thus, the findings lend initial support for process predictions of the PH, but 
need further investigation. 
Results from process tracing. According to the PH, individuals should search for information by 
comparing minimum outcomes, probabilities of minimum outcomes and maximum outcomes 
between gambles (e.g., moving from xMIN(A) to xMIN(B)). Integration models like CPT would, by 
contrast, predict that information is searched within gambles (e.g., moving from xMIN(A) to 
pMIN(A)). Johnson, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and Willemsen (2008) tested this prediction of the PH 
using the computer based information search tracing tool MouselabWeb. Participants were pre-
sented with gambles for which outcomes and probabilities were initially hidden in a matrix of 
information cells. Individuals had to search for information by moving the mouse on the infor-
mation cell. As soon as the mouse was moved over the information cell, its content was shown. 
The content was shown only as long as the mouse was placed on the information cell. Johnson et 
al. found that individuals mainly searched information within gambles. Comparisons between 
gambles are much less frequently observed. Thus, information search data speak against the view 7 
that the PH is employed but support the view that integrative models such as the CPT are em-
ployed. However, it is not possible to rule out that the way the information was presented in the 
experiment might have influenced information search. In a different work we have shown that 
under certain conditions the mouselab indeed influences decision strategies by restricting infor-
mation search (Glöckner & Betsch, 2007). In comparison to an open matrix presentation, which 
allows for information to be inspected without constraint, we found that the mouselab particu-
larly hampers automatic processes of decision making that might be important in the screening 
phase (step 0) postulated by the PH. Thus, the information search data that speak against the 
view that the PH is employed should be interpreted with caution. 
In sum, empirical results are equivocal and call for more thorough testing. We argue that this 
testing should consider three major methodological aspects. Most importantly, diagnostic deci-
sion tasks for which the primarily considered strategies PH and CPT make different predictions 
should be selected. Second, because the PH constitutes a process model, it cannot be cogently 
tested on aggregate choice data; individual choice data have to be analyzed. Third, in experi-
ments that aim at investigating information search, the research method should not hinder infor-
mation search, and open information presentation formats should be used. 
Methodological Preliminaries 
Diagnostic decision tasks. To test the PH against CPT it is necessary that both models make dif-
ferent predictions on the choices for some decision tasks and that a sufficient number of such 
decision tasks are included in the analysis. As already mentioned, a distinct prediction of the PH 
is that the certainty effect should disappear if the difference between minimum outcomes is low 
and the zero outcome is less probable. This can be formalized as follows: If in a decision task 
between two gambles with two positive outcomes and similar expected values (cf. step 0) the 
three conditions  
1 . 0 ) 3 (
) 2 (
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) ( ) (
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are fulfilled, the PH predicts that gamble A should be chosen, whereas CPT (with standard pa-
rameters;
2, predicts that gamble B should be chosen. Note that if condition (1) is fulfilled and one 
of the other conditions is violated, the PH can predict that gamble B will be chosen. We will re-
fer to decision tasks that fulfill all three conditions as CERTCON decision tasks (i.e., decision 
tasks in which the PH predictions are contrary to the certainty effect). We will call decision tasks 
that fulfill only the first condition CERTPRO decision tasks (i.e., decision tasks in which PH pre-
dictions are pro certainty effect). Obviously, such decision tasks can be used to identify individ-
ual decision strategies. A person who always chooses gamble B should be classified as a CPT 
                                        
2  See footnote 1.   8
user, whereas a person who always chooses gamble A in CERTCON and gamble B in CERTPRO 
decision tasks can be classified as a PH user.  
Further types of decision tasks that have the potential to differentiate between the PH and the 
CPT are decision tasks in which individual differences in the assessment of probabilities and 
values [i.e., in the curvature γ of the weighting function π(pi) and the curvature α of the value 
function v(xi)
3] can lead to choices that differ from the PH. From the indefinite number of possi-
ble decision tasks, we selected three categories using a theory-driven approach. The selection 
was validated by analyzing choice predictions using CPT with two different sets of parameters 
measured by Erev et al. (2002; as cited in Brandstätter et al., 2006) and Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992).  
First, we selected decision tasks for the category SIM, in which the expected utilities of both 
gambles were similar. Furthermore we selected decision tasks for the two categories 
MEDALM_CERT (i.e., decision tasks in which a medium outcome is almost certain) and MEDCERT 
(i.e., decision tasks in which a medium outcome is certain), which should also be sensitive to 
differences in the parameters of individual weighting and value function because they include a 
combination of high probabilities and high outcomes. We were able to confirm this theory-
driven selection by calculating and comparing expected utilities according to CPT using the two 
above-mentioned sets of parameters. For the category SIM, both sets of parameters led to similar 
expected utilities of the gambles. In the two other categories, the manipulation led to preference 
reversals between gambles.
 4 
SIM decision tasks consisted of two gambles with all similar outcomes and rather similar prob-
abilities such as a decision between gambles A (€50, .6; €60, .4) and B (€40, .5; €69, .5). 
MEDALM_CERT decision tasks are decision tasks in which a medium outcome is almost certain 
because, for both gamble A and gamble B, there is a large chance to win a medium outcome and 
a small chance to win a very high outcome or nothing [e.g., a decision between the gambles A 
(€100, .99; €0, .01) and B (€55, .90; €500, .1)]. MEDCERT decision tasks are problems in which a 
medium outcome is certain in gamble A because both outcomes are medium, and in gamble B 
there is a high chance to get a lower outcome and a small chance to get a very high outcome 
[e.g., a decision between gambles A (€146, .98; €160, .02) and B (€67, .85; €600, .15)].  
As intended by the selection of decision tasks, on an aggregated level the PH and CPT make 
completely different predictions concerning choices for the considered categories of decision 
tasks (Table 1). For simplicity, all decision tasks are coded in such a way that gamble A is the 
choice predicted by the PH. If individuals perfectly use the PH, all choices in all categories 
                                        
3   See footnote 1. 
4  Erev et al. (2002; as cited in Brandstätter et al., 2006) estimated the curvatures of the value function and the 
weighting function to be α = 0.33 and γ = 0.75. Based on a different data set, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
estimated the parameters to be α = 0.88 and γ = 0.61. We used both sets of parameters to calculate expected 
utilities (V) using Formula 1. As expected, for all SIM decision tasks used in Experiments 1 and 3 (see  
Appendix A) very similar expected utilities were found. For all MEDALM_CERT and MEDCERT the application 
of the parameters by Erev et al. (2002; as cited in Brandstätter et al., 2006) as compared to the   
parameters by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) led to the predicted preference reversals. 9 
should be in favor of gamble A. Considering random processing errors in applying the PH, the 
probability of choices for gamble A should be p = 1 - ε. Under the assumption of random proc-
essing errors, it can be assumed that the error rate is equal in all categories: ε1 = ε2 = ε3 = ε4 = ε5. 
Therefore, the probabilities of choices for gamble A should also be the same: p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = 
p5 = 1 - ε. In contrast, if all individuals use CPT with a constant error rate of εP, almost all partici-
pants (p1 = 1 - εP) should choose gamble A in the CERTPRO decision tasks, whereas almost none 
of the participants (p2 = εP) should choose gamble A in the CERTCON decision tasks. Medium 
levels of choices for gamble A are predicted for SIM, MEDALM_CERT and MEDCERT decision 
tasks because, depending on individual weighting and value functions, a substantial share of the 
participants (pR) can be expected to choose gamble B (besides random processing errors).     
            
  Proportion of Choices for Gamble A 
 Priority  Heuristic  Cumulative Prospect Theory 
CERTPRO  very high (p1=1-ε1)  very high (p1=1-εP) 
CERTCON  very high (p2=1-ε2)  very low (p2=εP) 
SIM  very high (p3=1-ε3) medium  (p3=1-pR1-εP) 
MEDALM_CERT  very high (p4=1-ε4) medium  (p4=1- pR2-εP) 
MEDCERT  very high (p5=1-ε5) medium  (p5=1- pR3-εP) 
 
Table 1 
Aggregated Choice Predictions for Decision Tasks        
 
Analysis of individual choices. One of the challenges of behavioral decision research is to iden-
tify decision strategies on an individual level without influencing decision strategies by the re-
search paradigm (Glöckner & Betsch, 2007). One method that has been repeatedly used (e.g., 
Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Bröder, 2003; Bröder & Schiffer, 2003a; Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b; 
Bröder, 2005; Glöckner, 2006) is a maximum-likelihood method for comparative model testing 
(cf. Wasserman, 2000). Thereby, individual choice patterns are compared with the differential 
predictions of a set of decision strategies to determine which strategy is most likely to account 
for the individual choice patterns (under the assumption of a fixed error probability). Specifi-
cally, in our experiments we compared the predictions of the PH against the predictions of CPT. 
The test of CPT requires that the parameters for the weighting and value functions be estimated 
(see Footnote 1 and Footnote 4). In line with Brandstätter et al. (2006), we aimed to avoid esti-
mating the optimal parameters for the CPT in reference to the data set for which choices should 
be predicted; we used sets of parameters estimated in different earlier studies instead. Note that 
this method disfavors CPT (and thus makes classifications for the PH more likely) because in 
this way suboptimal parameters are considered for CPT. We nevertheless used this method for 
two reasons: first, to avoid the objection that CPT profits from the fact that it has more free pa-  10
rameters than the PH, and second, to replicate Brandstätter et al. (2006). For strategy classifica-
tion we used two of the sets of parameters also applied by Brandstätter et al. (2006), which were 
estimated in earlier studies by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Erev et al. (2002; as cited in 
Brandstätter et al., 2006).
5 
Process measures. One widely used method to access correlates of decision processes consists in 
tracing information search. It can be used to validate findings from individual choice analyses. 
Johnson et al. (2008) used the MouselabWEB to present outcomes and probabilities of gambles 
and to measure information search by recording mouse movements. In recent research, Glöckner 
and Betsch (2007) have shown that the mouselab procedure itself influences decision making by 
hindering information search (cf. Lohse & Johnson, 1996). This might be particularly problem-
atic for the PH which predicts that, before applying the heuristic, individuals engage in a quick 
screening of the payoffs to form an initial impression of the decision task (step 0). It is possible 
that the mouselab procedure hinders screening and changes the individuals’ decision strategies.  
This problem can be avoided by applying an open mouselab method (Glöckner & Betsch, 2007). 
Participants should be given the opportunity to quickly screen the entire set of information, and 
thereafter information search is able to be recorded by tracing participants actions after instruct-
ing them to move the mouse to the piece of information they have just considered. Such a proce-
dure decreases the likelihood that the information presentation format will hinder the application 
of the PH because it makes fast screening possible. We used such an open mouselab method in 
the third experiment.  
Overview of Experiments 
We tested choice predictions and process predictions of the PH in three experiments. All studies 
applied diagnostic decision tasks. Choice data was supplemented with complementary data ob-
tained from process measures, particularly decision time data (Experiment 1 and 3) and informa-
tion search parameters (Experiment 3). In Experiment 1 we tested whether the PH can predict 
individual choices and decision times when diagnostic decision tasks are used and choices are 
analyzed on an aggregated and on an individual level. Specifically, we aimed to test the choice 
predictions of the PH and the CPT. In Experiment 2 we aimed to replicate these results and to 
investigate the more general hypothesis behind the PH that information is integrated in a non-
compensatory manner, rather than a compensatory one. Thereby, we took into account the possi-
bility that individuals might use different aspiration levels. In the third experiment, based on an 
open mouselab method, we tested the process predictions of the PH that information is mainly 
searched by a process in which outcomes between gambles are compared. 
 
 
                                        
5   The parameters can be found in footnote 4 above. 11 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  
Presentation format of decision tasks used in Experiment 1 and 2 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and design. Eighty-two undergraduate students with different majors from the Uni-
versity of Erfurt participated in the experiment, which was part of a one-hour experimental bat-
tery. They were paid €6 and completed 40 decision tasks. Decision tasks were manipulated using 
a within-subjects design in which each respondent makes 8 similar decisions in each of the 5 
categories of decision tasks.  
Procedure and materials. The experiment was computerized. First, participants were familiar-
ized with the decision task using the following instruction: 
You will be repeatedly presented with pairs of gambles. You should decide which of 
the gambles you would prefer to play. Each gamble has exactly two possible outco-
mes, A and B, which have some given probability of coming about. Each outcome 
leads to a certain monetary gain, which is given in Euro. [Example omitted] This 
means that in gamble 1 you have 30% chance of winning €10 and a 70% chance of 
winning €20, and so on. Your task is to select the gamble you prefer. Press “y” to se-
lect gamble 1 and press “m” to select gamble 2. [page break] If you have any questi-
ons, please ask the experimenter; otherwise press continue [page break] Please note: 
try to make accurate decisions and to proceed as quickly as possible. Put the left fin-
ger on “y” and the right finger on “m” and press both keys to start the decision phase. 
The time pressure instruction was used to encourage the application of simple heuristics like the 
PH. Gambles were presented on the left and right sides of the screen (Figure 1), and participants 
were to select between the gambles by pressing a key on the left or right side of the keyboard 
(please note that the position of the keys “y” and “z” are reversed in German keyboards). 
Choices and decision times were recorded as dependent variables. 
Forty decision tasks (see Appendix A) were shown in individual randomized order. The presen-
tation order of the gambles (i.e., gamble A first or gamble B first) and the order of outcomes 
within each gamble (i.e., low outcome first vs. high outcome first) were changed between trials 
to prevent gamble A from always being the gamble predicted by the PH. The 40 presented deci-
sion tasks were eight different versions of the five categories of decision tasks introduced above 
        Gamble 1 
 
A     50%  100€ 
 
B     50%  50€ 
        Gamble 2 
 
A     65%  40€ 
 
B     35%  140€   12
(see Table 1): CERTPRO, CERTCON, SIM, MEDALM_CERT
6 and MEDCERT. Each gamble had two 
non-negative outcomes. The expected value for each pair of gambles was approximately equal.
7 
As such, the conditions for the application of the PH were optimal: individuals were instructed to 
decide fast, expected values did not differ between gambles, and it was possible to quickly 
screen the information. 
For convenience, we will shortly recapitulate the predictions of CPT concerning choices: in 
CERTPRO decision tasks, the predictions of the PH are in line with the predictions of the CPT; 
thus a high percentage of choices for gamble A (i.e., the gamble that is predicted by the PH) is 
expected. In CERTCON decision tasks, the PH predicts against CPT and a low percentage of 
choices for gamble A is expected. In SIM decision tasks, expected values are rather similar; 
therefore a medium level of choices for gamble A is expected. In MEDALM_CERT and MEDCERT 
decision tasks, again a medium frequency of choices for gamble A is expected because individ-
ual differences in value and weighting function can lead to choices for gamble A and B. In con-
trast, the PH predicts an equally high proportion of choices for gamble A in all five categories.  
As outlined above, the predictions of the PH were compared with the predictions of CPT with 
two sets of parameters derived by Erev et al. (2002; as cited in Brandstätter et al., 2006) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). As intended by the authors, there was little overlap among the 
three considered decision strategies on choice predictions in the 40 decision tasks selected for the 
experiment. In 62% of the decision tasks the PH and the CPT-Erev (i.e., the CPT with the pa-
rameters derived by Erev et al., 2002; as cited in Brandstätter et al., 2006) made the same predic-
tions. For PH and CPT-T&K (i.e., CPT with the parameters derived by Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992), the overlap was at 45%. The overlap between CPT-Erev and CPT-T&K was 48%. Thus, 
the overlap in predictions was considerably lower than in the decision tasks used by Brandstätter 
et al. (2006), which should allow for a reliable classification of decision strategies. 
According to the PH, decision times should be the same for the categories CERTPRO, SIM, 
MEDALM_CERT and MEDCERT because in all cases, at least the aspiration level, the minimum out-
comes of both gambles differ. Thus, for all four categories of decision tasks, equivalent decision 
times can be expected. Only in CERTCON decision tasks the probability of the minimum gain has 
to be considered, and a higher decision time is predicted by the PH.  
We expected that individuals will not use the PH and that the results reported by Brandstätter et 
al. (2006) are caused by the fact that insufficient diagnostic decision tasks were used and data 
was analyzed on an aggregated level only. Thus, we tested the following hypotheses derived 
from the PH and expected all of them to be falsified:  
                                        
6  Due to rounding to prominent numbers, the difference in minimum gains lay below the rounded aspiration 
level in decision task 4 of the category MEDALM_CERT, which was not intended by the authors. Additional 
analysis showed that omitting decision task 4 from analysis would not substantially influence the results. 
7  In some decision tasks, expected values of the gambles differed slightly due to rounding errors. The differ-
ences were in each case lower than €1.  13 
H1: The proportions of choices for gamble A do not differ between the categories CERTPRO, 
CERTCON, SIM, MEDALM_CERT and MEDCERT. 
H2: The majority of individual choice patterns are in line with the predictions of the PH. 
H3: Decision times are higher in CERTCON decision tasks than in the remaining decision tasks. 
Results and Interpretation 
Aggregated choices. As mentioned above, all choices were coded so that the PH predicts choices 
for gamble A only. To test the first hypothesis – i.e., that choice probabilities for gamble A and 
B do not differ between categories – a χ
2-test was conducted on the independence between 
choices (gamble A, gamble B) and the categories of decision tasks (CERTPRO, CERTCON, SIM, 
MEDALM_CERT, MEDCERT). The test turned out to be highly significant, χ
2 (4, N=3280) = 593.0, p 
< .001. Thus, hypothesis H1 was rejected. Figure 2 indicates that the specific prediction of the 
PH – namely that the certainty effect would disappear if the minimum gains did not differ con-
siderably – was not supported by the data. In CERTCON decision tasks, almost all participants 
selected the option predicted by CPT and the certainty effect (i.e., gamble B) instead of the op-
tion predicted by the PH. 
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Figure 2.  
Choices for gamble A (i.e., PH prediction) in Experiment 1, with error bars indicating 95% confidence  
intervals for proportions. 
 
Note that aggregated choice proportions for the categories descriptively follow the predictions of 
the CPT (cf. Table 1). A high proportion of choices for gamble A was observed in CERTPRO de-  14
cision tasks; a low proportion was observed in CERTCON decision tasks; and the proportions in 
the other categories lay in between. 
Individual analysis. Overall, only 59% of the individual choices were in line with the predictions 
of the PH. Note that the predictive accuracy of the PH is therefore just slightly above the level of 
chance (i.e., 50% in decision tasks between two gambles). However, it would be incorrect to 
conclude from this proportion that none of the participants used PH, as it would also be wrong to 
conclude that 59% of the participants did use this strategy. Therefore an analysis was run on an 
individual level to determine if individual choices can be better explained by the PH, the CPT-
Erev or the CPT-T&K. 
The model fit for each of the three considered decision strategies was estimated using the maxi-
mum-likelihood method (also called Bayesian strategy classification method; Bröder & Schiffer, 
2003a) outlined above. The method is based on the estimation of the conditional likelihood that a 
specific individual choice pattern is observed given a certain decision strategy and a constant 
error rate. The specific details of the strategy classification method are described in Appendix B.  
The results of the strategy classification are depicted in Table 2. For about 78% of the partici-
pants, choices can be best explained by one of the two versions of CPT. Only for 9% of the par-
ticipants did the PH offer a better account of the observed choice patterns. Thus, hypothesis H2, 
which proposed that the majority of individual choice patterns are in line with the PH, is also not 
supported by the data. 
  Strategy Classification 
  n  % Prediction  Rate Md(L-Ratio) 
PH 7  .09  .67  2 
CPT (Erev et al., 2002)  40  .49  .75  18 
CPT (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992)  23  .28  .77  39 
Not classified  12  .15     
 
Table 2 
Individuals’ Decision Strategies in Experiment 1 
 
Note. The table shows the results of the individual strategy classification for the 82 participants of Ex-
periment 1; n refers to the number of participants classified for the respective strategy. The column Pre-
diction Rate shows the proportions of correct predictions of the respective strategy for the participants 
classified as users of this strategy. The far right column shows the median of the likelihood ratios for the 
strategy classification. The likelihood ratio is computed by dividing the likelihood for the classified strategy 
by the sum of the likelihoods of the remaining strategies. Higher values indicate that strategy classifica-
tion is more reliable. 
 
The median of the likelihood ratios, which are computed by dividing the likelihood value for the 
best strategy by the sum of the likelihood values for the remaining strategies for each participant, 
is given in the far right column of Table 2. The likelihood ratio is a measure for the reliability of 
the classification, with high numbers indicating high reliability. It can be seen that classifications 
for CPT were rather reliable, whereas classifications for the PH were less reliable. Furthermore, 15 
the third column of Table 2 shows the proportion of correct predictions of each strategy for the 
participants classified as users of this strategy. In line with the results concerning likelihood ra-
tios, both versions of the CPT had a higher correct prediction rate than the PH. 
Decision times. First, decision times were screened for extreme outliers (M +/- 3 SD) and very 
low decision times (t < 500ms), which were deleted (2.3% of the data points). The average deci-
sion time for the remaining data points was 5.5 seconds. Decision times were analyzed using a 
repeated measurement analysis of covariance with the five categories of decision tasks as the 
within-subjects factor, and with the order of the presentation as a covariate. The main effect of 
the factor category turned out to be highly significant, F(4, 326) = 22.6, p < .001, η
2 = .22, indi-
cating substantial decision time differences between categories. Average decision times and 95% 
confidence intervals are depicted in Figure 3. It can be seen that the highest decision time is  
observed for SIM. To test the third hypothesis – namely, that decision times are higher for 
CERTCON than for the remaining decision tasks – a planned contrast was computed, comparing 
decision times of CERTCON against the mean. The contrast turned out to be significant, z = 2.48, 
p < .05, but in the opposite direction. Decision times in the CERTCON decision tasks were sig-
nificantly lower than the mean of the remaining decision tasks. Thus, hypothesis H3, which was 
derived from the PH, was rejected as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  
Decision times in Experiment 1 with error bars indicating 95% confidence intervals. 
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Discussion 
The aim of the first experiment was to provide a critical empirical test of the PH as compared to 
CPT, using diagnostic decision tasks and an individual-level analysis of decision strategies. 
Based on our findings, three hypotheses that were derived from the PH had to be rejected. First, 
it was shown on an aggregated level that the proportion of choices for gamble A (i.e., PH predic-
tions) differs significantly among categories. In the categories that contain mainly un-diagnostic 
gambles (i.e., gambles in which the predictions of the PH and CPT dovetail; e.g., CERTPRO), a 
high proportion of choices for gamble A was observed, whereas choices for gamble A were con-
siderably lower in categories with diagnostic gambles (e.g., CERTCON). The data did not support 
the PH prediction that the certainty effect should disappear under specific conditions. In sum, 
aggregated choices were in line with the predictions of CPT and strongly conflicted with the pre-
dictions of the PH (cf. Table 1 and Figure 2). Second, it was found that the large majority of in-
dividual choice patterns can be better explained by CPT than by the PH. There were only very 
few individuals for whom choices were roughly in line with the predictions of the PH, and the 
mean reliability of these classifications was low. Finally, it could be shown that decision times 
were not in line with the prediction of the PH. No increased decision time for decision tasks in 
the category CERTCON were observed; on the contrary, decision time was even significantly 
lower in this category compared to the mean of the decision time in the remaining categories. 
In our experiment, the observed rate of choices that could be explained by the PH was consid-
erably lower than in the simulations reported by Brandstätter et al. (2006) (59% vs. 87%), and it 
was marginally above chance level. According to our data, the major reason for this difference 
(besides aggregation effects) is that Brandstätter et al. used decision tasks that were not diagnos-
tic for the decision strategies PH and CPT. In categories of decision tasks in which there was a 
high overlap between the choice predictions from the PH with CPT, a high accuracy rate for the 
PH was observed, whereas the prediction rate was substantially lower in categories with low 
overlap. In the decision tasks used in the simulations of Brandstätter et al., choice predictions of 
the PH and the CPT-Erev had an overlap of 89%; respectively, the PH was observed to lead to 
87% correct predictions. In our experiment the overlap was 62%, the PH was observed to lead to 
59% correct predictions. 
Decision time results sharply conflict with the previous findings (Brandstätter et al., 2006, pp. 
423). Individual decision times did not increase in those tasks for which the PH predicted an in-
crease in the depth of processing. In line with classic (Cartwright, 1941; Cartwright & Festinger, 
1943; Festinger, 1943a; Festinger, 1943b) and more recent (Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Glöck-
ner, 2006) findings, decision times were highest for “hard” decision tasks in which the (subjec-
tive) expected utility of both options was almost equal (i.e., SIM decision tasks). 
In Experiment 2, we wanted to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 using different diagnostic 
decision tasks. In addition we wanted to examine whether the predictive performance of the PH 
increases if aspiration levels of different sizes are considered (cf. Brandstätter et al., 2006, p. 
425). A generalized version of the PH that was based on relaxed assumptions about aspiration 17 
levels was tested. To carry out the analysis, we introduced a generalized lexicographic (genLEX) 
strategy, which is a generalization of the PH that allows for aspiration levels ranging from 1/10 
to 1/3 (for minimum gains and probabilities of minimum gains). The upper limit of aspiration 
levels (i.e., 1/3) was selected based on the authors’ estimation that gains (and probabilities) that 
differ by more than 1/3 (or .33) should usually not be considered to be equal. Specifically, we 
tested the following hypothesis derived by genLEX and expected that this hypothesis would be 
rejected:  
H4:  Manipulations of minimum gains and probabilities of minimum gains below the aspi-
ration level of 1/10 and above the aspiration level of 1/3 do not influence choices.  
Additionally, in an exploratory account we aimed to investigate whether individuals indeed use 
aspiration levels for differences in minimum gains or minimum probabilities when they compare 
gambles. Therefore, in five sets of decision tasks, differences of minimum gains and probabili-
ties of minimum gains were systematically manipulated. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and fifty-four students from different majors took part in 
the study, which was part of a 1.5-hour experimental battery. They were rewarded with €9. Deci-
sion tasks were manipulated within-subjects between five sets. Each set consisted of six to 
twelve decision tasks in which one fixed reference gamble was compared with different compet-
ing gambles. Competing gambles were manipulated within sets so that the differences in mini-
mum gains or probability of minimum gains were systematically varied, resulting in the further 
within-subjects factor decision tasks, which was nested within the factor sets.   
Procedure and materials. Experiment 2 used essentially the same procedure as in the previous 
experiment, but with different decision tasks. Forty decisions between two gambles with two 
outcomes and a constant expected value of €100 were used. Five sets of decision tasks were con-
structed, in which one gamble was held constant and one pay-off (minimum gain or probability 
of minimum gain) for the other gamble was varied. To hold the expected value of the manipu-
lated gamble constant, a complementary parameter of the same gamble was changed accordingly 
(see Appendix C).  
In the first set, gamble A (€90, .50; €110, .50) was compared with gamble B, for which the 
minimum gain was varied on 12 levels from €85 to €0 (while the maximum gain was increased 
from €115 to €200 respectively). Thus, gamble B was manipulated from  
(€85,   .50[fix];   €115,  .50[fix]) to 
(€0,   .50[fix];   €200,  .50[fix]).   18
Elements with the subscript "[fix]" were held constant. According to the genLEX, there should 
be a flip in choice proportions from gamble B to gamble A after the aspiration level for differ-
ences in minimum gains is reached. The inflection point of the choice function would indicate 
the aspiration level that is used by the majority of the participants. 
In sets 2 and 3, the minimum gains of both gambles did not differ by more than 1/10 (set 2), or 
the minimum gains were exactly equal (set 3). The probabilities of the minimum gains were ma-
nipulated on 8 levels ranging from high to low probabilities. In both sets the fixed gamble was 
gamble A (€10, .90; €910, .10). In set 2, the probabilities and outcomes of gamble B were ma-
nipulated from  
(€0[fix], .99;    €10000, .01) to 
(€0[fix], .20;      €125,     .80). 
In set 3, the probabilities and outcomes of gamble B were manipulated from  
(€10[fix], .85;     €610,     .15) to  
(€10[fix], .10;     €110,     .90). 
According to the genLEX, in set 2 all choices should be for gamble A (a flip of choice propor-
tions would only be expected if the aspiration level of probabilities is below .10). Choice propor-
tions in set 3 should flip from gamble A to gamble B after the difference in probabilities of 
minimum gains reaches the aspiration level for probabilities of minimum gains.  
In sets 4 and 5, again, the difference in minimum gains between the gambles was manipulated. In 
both sets, gambles were compared with a fix gamble A (€70, .70; €170, .30), and the minimum 
gain was decreased in 6 levels, starting from close to €70. The crucial difference between the 
two sets concerned the probabilities of the minimum gains. In set 4, the probabilities of the 
minimum gains were higher for the fix gamble A than for the varied gamble B, whereas in set 5, 
the probabilities of minimum gains for gamble B were higher. In set 4, the outcomes and prob-
abilities of gamble B were manipulated from  
(€65,  .50[fix];  €135, .50[fix]) to 
(€40,  .50[fix];    €160, .50[fix]). 
In set 5, the outcomes and probabilities of gamble B were manipulated from  
(€60,   .90[fix];   €460,   .10[fix]) to  
(€0,    .90[fix];   €1000, .10[fix]). 
In set 4, according to the genLEX, a flip in choice proportions from gamble B to gamble A 
would be expected when the aspiration level used by the majority of individuals is reached. In set 19 
5, no changes in choice proportions would be predicted by the genLEX because minimum gains 
as well as the probability of minimum gains point towards gamble A in all decision tasks. 
In sum, sets 1 and 4 aimed to determine if there is a constant aspiration level for the first reason 
postulated by the PH (and the genLEX), “minimum gain”. If the argumentation of Brandstätter et 
al. (2006) is correct, this aspiration level should be around 1/10 of the maximum gain, which 
should result in a flip of choice proportions after this level is reached. In sets 2 and 3, aspiration 
levels for the second reason, “probability of minimum gain,” are measured. If the PH holds true, 
the expected inflection point for choice proportions should be around .10. For both reasons, ob-
served inflection points could be used to determine the aspiration level mainly used by individuals.  
To replicate findings from Experiment 1, the decision tasks of the five sets were again selected to 
be diagnostic for the decision strategies PH, CPT-Erev and CPT-T&K. There was an overlap in 
predictions of .67 between the PH and CPT-Erev, and an overlap of .47 between the PH and 
CPT-T&K. Both CPT versions shared .55 of the choice predictions. Note that the overlap of the 
strategies with the genLEX cannot be computed because choice predictions differ for different 
aspiration levels. 
Results and Interpretation 
Individual choice analysis. First, the proportion of individual choices in line with the predictions 
of the PH was computed per participant. The overall mean was .53 (SE = .009). Thus, the results 
of Experiment 1 could be replicated with a different set of diagnostic decision tasks. The predic-
tive accuracy of the PH was again just slightly above the chance level. Second, individual choice 
patterns were analyzed using the maximum likelihood method described in Appendix B (sets 
were used as categories of decision tasks). The results replicated the findings of Experiment 1. 
For the large majority of participants, choices could be best explained by the versions of CPT 
(Table 3). Only for very few participants was the PH a better model for explaining their choices. 
Again, classifications for the PH were rather unreliable (i.e., lower median of likelihood ratios), 
and even for the eight participants classified as PH users, the PH made only .60 correct predic-
tions, which is again just slightly above chance level. 
 Strategy  Classification 
  n  % Prediction  Rate Md(L-Ratio) 
PH 8  .05  .60  2 
CPT (Erev et al., 2002)  75  .49  .77  18 
CPT (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992)  31  .20  .68  5 
Not classified  38  .25     
 
Table 3 
Individuals’ Decision Strategies in Experiment 2 
   20
Analysis of aspiration levels. Figures 4a to 4e depict the choice functions, with error bars indicat-
ing 95% confidence intervals of proportions for the decision tasks of sets 1 to 5. In sets 1, 3 and 
4, two dotted lines mark the positions in which the limits of aspiration levels of 1/10 (left line) 
and of 1/3 (right line) are reached. If individuals use differences in minimum gains or probabili-
ties of minimum gains in a non-compensatory manner and (plausible) aspiration levels from 1/10 
to 1/3 (i.e., genLEX), a flip of choice proportions within the area marked by the dotted lines 
would be expected. Outside the dotted lines, no differences would be expected.  
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Figure 4a-e.  
Choices in Experiment 2, with error bars indicating 95% confidence intervals for proportions. The two 
dotted lines mark when the aspiration levels of 1/10 (left line) and of 1/3 (right line) are reached.   
 
We investigated H4 by testing separately against the null hypotheses a) that manipulations of 
differences below 1/10 do not influence choices, and b) that manipulations of differences above 21 
1/3 do not influence choices; χ
2-test of independence between choices for gambles A and B, and 
the respective decision tasks within each set were computed. The compared decision tasks and 
the results of the tests are summarized in Table 4.   
       Strategy  Classification 
 Manipulation  Changes in 
Choices for 
Analyzed  
Decisions   N df  χ
2  p 
Set 1  xMIN(B)  Differences>1/3  Tasks 8 to 12  770  4  17.09  <.01 
Set 2  pMIN(B) 
Differences<1/10 
Differences>1/3 
Tasks 1 to 3 
Tasks 7 to 8 
462 
308 
2 
1 
1.52 
11.13 
n.s. 
<.01 
Set 3  pMIN(B)  Differences>1/3  Tasks 6 to 8  462  2  13.57  <.01 
Set 4  xMIN(B)  Differences<1/10  Tasks 1 to 3  462  2  2.11  n.s. 
Set 5  xMIN(B)  Differences<1/10  Tasks 1 to 6  924  5  115.72  <.001 
 
Table 4 
Tests against Equal Distributions of Choices in Experiment 2  
 
Note. The table presents the results of tests of the H4 – i.e., that manipulations of differences in minimum 
gains (xMIN) or differences in probabilities in minimum gains (pMIN) below 1/10 or above 1/3 should not 
influence choices. The three left columns indicate the set within which the manipulation was conducted, 
the variable which was manipulated within the set and the section of differences that was tested (i.e., the 
question is whether manipulations of differences below 1/10 aspiration levels influence choices or 
whether manipulations of differences above 1/3 aspiration levels influence choices). The fourth column 
indicates the decision tasks within the set, for which an equal distribution is predicted if the manipulation 
outside the aspiration levels (i.e., below 1/10 or above 1/3) does not influence choices. χ
2 tests of inde-
pendence between choices for option A and B and the respective decision tasks (i.e., fourth column) were 
conducted to test the hypotheses. The number of observations, degrees of freedom, the χ
2 values and the 
p values of these significance tests are depicted in the four right columns. Significant values indicate that 
H4 was rejected. 
 
All three tests that investigated whether changes in differences above the maximal considered 
aspiration level (1/3) influence choices turned out significant. Furthermore, one of the three tests 
that investigated whether changes in differences below the minimal considered aspiration level 
(1/10) influence choices was significant. Thus, H4, which postulates that changes of minimum 
gains and probabilities of minimum gains below an aspiration level of 1/10 and above an aspira-
tion level of 1/3 do not influence choices, was rejected. These results speak against the usage of 
aspiration levels as hypothesized by the genLEX and the PH.  
Further evidence against the application of a genLEX strategy is provided by a closer investiga-
tion of set 5. In set 5, genLEX users with any aspiration level for differences in minimum gains 
should choose gamble A in all six decision tasks, because the first and the second reasons 
(minimum gain and probability of minimum gain) speak for gamble A. Only people for whom 
the first two reasons do not differentiate (i.e., people with particularly high aspiration levels for 
the probability of minimum gains) select gamble B in all six decision tasks. Note, however, that   22
any distribution of intra-individually stable aspiration levels would lead to a constant rate of 
choices for gamble A (and gamble B) in all six decision tasks. In contrast to this prediction, 
choice proportions for gamble B significantly decreased between decision tasks 1 and 6 (cf. Ta-
ble 4; last row). Therefore, set 5 provides the most clear-cut evidence against the genLEX and 
against the idea that information is used in a non-compensatory manner, as suggested by Brand-
stätter et al. (2006).  
Discussion 
The findings of Experiment 2 replicate the results of the previous experiment, in that the PH 
cannot account for individuals’ choices for sets of decision tasks that contain diagnostic deci-
sions. Again, CPT seems to be the more appropriate model for describing choices. Additionally, 
choices seem to be influenced by the manipulation of the minimum gains and the probabilities of 
minimum gains that were below and above reasonable aspiration levels (i.e., 1/10 and 1/3). This 
finding speaks against the fact that the reasons “minimum gain” and “probability of minimum 
gain” are used in a non-compensatory manner. Thus, the general principle underlying the PH − 
that individuals apply simple non-compensatory heuristics (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) in risky 
choices − has to be questioned.  
Evidence of both reported experiments speaks clearly against the application of the PH and also 
against the general idea that the reasons postulated by Brandstätter et al. (2006) are considered in 
a non-compensatory manner based on aspiration levels. Thus, our findings are in line with the 
information-search results of Johnson et al. (2008), which indicate that information is not 
searched in line with the prediction of the PH. Nevertheless, as pointed out above, the results by 
Johnson et al. (2008) could be criticized for methodological reasons. It cannot be ruled out that 
the mouselab method used by Johnson et al. hindered information search and the application of 
the PH. To rule out this possible objection and to strengthen our reported results, a further ex-
periment was conducted in which the decision tasks of Experiment 1 were presented in an open 
mouselab format so that information was instantly available to the participants. To bolster the 
application of the PH, individuals were explicitly instructed to screen all information before 
starting the decision process. Individuals were instructed to move the mouse to the information 
they were currently considering. This movement was used to record the information search. We 
tested the following hypotheses derived by the PH and expected to reject them: 
H5:  Individuals inspect only a part of the information (as proposed by the stopping rule 
of the PH).  
H6:   Individuals show information search transitions mainly between gambles (i.e., by 
comparing gains or probabilities between gambles) and fewer transitions within 
gambles. 23 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants and design. Thirty-three undergraduate students of different majors from the Uni-
versity of Erfurt participated in the experiment, which was part of a one-hour experimental bat-
tery. They were paid €6. In line with Experiment 1, decision tasks were manipulated using a 
within-subjects design in which each participant makes 8 decisions in each of the 5 categories of 
decision tasks. 
Procedure and materials. Experiment 3 employed essentially the same general instructions and 
the same decision tasks of Experiment 1. However, in contrast to Experiment 1, information was 
presented in an open mouselab (Figure 5) and participants were instructed to first screen infor-
mation and then to move the mouse to the information currently being considered. The following 
additional instruction was used: 
The information [about the gambles] will be presented in a circle format. On the left side you see 
the two possible outcomes of gamble 1, and on the right side you see the two possible outcomes 
of gamble 2. [example omitted] We would like to record your information search; to facilitate 
this, please try to follow your eye movements with the mouse. Please move the mouse to the 
point on the screen you are looking at. [example omitted] Try first to get an overview of the de-
cision situation by screening all values. Then click on the start button in the middle of the screen 
to start the decision. Move the mouse to the information (gains or probabilities) you are currently 
inspecting. If you have come to a decision, click on the button of the gamble. [example omitted] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  
Open mouselab presentation of gambles in Experiment 3. 
Start Gamble 1  Gamble 2 
A 
B 
A
B
100€ 
60€ 
60€ 
30€ 
30% 
70% 
50% 
50%   24
The start button in the middle was used to center the mouse on the screen after the initial infor-
mation screening so that the distance to all pieces of information was approximately equal. In the 
decision phase, information about what the mouse was currently pointing at was highlighted with 
a light-green background color. After each decision, an instruction screen was shown. The next 
decision task was started by mouse-click. In an attempt to force individuals to obey the instruc-
tions and to follow the eye movements with the mouse, it was not possible to select an option 
before at least two pieces of information had been inspected (and touched with the mouse). If 
individuals tried to select an option before that, a message box informed them that they should 
first inspect information and that they should always move the mouse to the inspected informa-
tion so that it is highlighted.  
After one learning trial with instruction and one learning trial without instruction, the 40 decision 
tasks of Experiment 1 were presented (Appendix A) in an individually randomized order. Note 
that the fourth decision task of the category MEDALM_CERT was modified to correct for the round-
ing error discussed in Footnote 3. Thus, the fourth MEDALM_CERT decision task in Experiment 3 
was a choice between gambles A (€217, .92; €1800, .08) and B (€0, .02; €350, .98). Choices and 
information search were recorded. Decision times were measured from the pressing of the start 
button to the selection of an option. 
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Figure 6.  
Choices for gamble A (i.e., PH prediction) in Experiment 3 with error bars indicating 95% confidence in-
tervals for proportions. 25 
Results 
Choices and decision time. The choice distributions almost exactly replicated the findings of Ex-
periment 1 (Figure 6), indicating that the differences in choice proportions between categories are 
rather stable and that the open mouselab presentation method does not influence choices. Overall, 
again only 60 percent of the individual choices were in line with the predictions of the PH.  
For the analysis of decision times, again extreme outliers (M +/- 3 SD) and decision times below 
500ms were deleted; this was necessary for 1.8 percent of the data points. Decision times were 
overall slower than in Experiment 1, but they did replicate the general pattern (Figure 7). Again, 
decisions were made particularly slower in the SIM decision tasks and faster in the other deci-
sion tasks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  
Decision times in Experiment 3, with error bars indicating 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Information search. On average, the participants investigated 9.2 pieces of information (SE = 
.46) in the decision phase of each task. Note that only eight pieces of information were available. 
Thus, on average, each of the pieces of information was inspected more than once. This finding 
is in line with the prediction of CPT that all information is taken into account, but the finding 
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conflicts with the prediction of the PH that a part of the information is ignored.  According to the 
PH, it would be expected that only the two minimum gains are inspected in the categories 
CERTPRO, SIM, MEDALM_CERT and MEDCERT (i.e., 2 pieces of information), and in the category 
CERTCON minimum gains and probabilities of minimum gains (i.e., 4 pieces of information) are 
looked up. Therefore, the PH predicts an average information acquisition rate of 3.2. A t test re-
vealed that the overall information acquisition rate was significantly higher than this predicted 
acquisition rate, t (31) = 13.0, p < .001. Thus, the H5 – namely that individuals use a frugal strat-
egy of information search as suggested by the PH – was rejected.     
According to the PH, probabilities should only be inspected if gains do not differ (i.e., in cate-
gory CERTCON), which should result in a much lower overall inspection rate for probabilities 
than for gains, whereas CPT would predict approximately equal inspection rates. The observed 
inspection rates were only slightly higher for gains (M=5.0) than for probabilities (M=4.2), 
which is more in line with the prediction of CPT. 
To analyze the direction of information search and to test the H6, which proposes that an infor-
mation search should be carried out mainly between gambles and less often within gambles, a 
CPT-transition index and a PH-transition index were computed. The CPT-transition index was 
computed by counting all information search transitions within gambles, and the PH-transition 
index was computed by counting all direct transitions between gains or probabilities of both 
gambles. A multivariate analysis of variance with the two scores as dependent variables revealed 
significant differences between both scores, Pillais V = .91, F(1, 32) = 332.9, p < .001. In line 
with findings by Johnson et al. (2008), individuals mainly searched information within gambles 
(MCPT-Index = 4.80, SE = 0.26) and only very few transitions between gambles were observed 
(MPH-Index = 0.49, SE = 0.05). Thus, the H6, which proposes that individuals compare information 
between gambles by carrying out information search transitions between gambles, has to be 
clearly rejected. In line with the predictions of the CPT and in line with earlier findings, informa-
tion is mainly searched within gambles. 
Discussion 
The third experiment aimed at testing the PH by investigating hypotheses concerning informa-
tion search behavior. The analysis showed that information search was not frugal but exhaustive 
and that information searches mainly occur within gambles and not in a direct comparison of 
gains and losses between gambles. Both findings are in line with the predictions of CPT. The 
two hypotheses derived from the PH had to be rejected. Individuals do not use frugal information 
search strategies that ignore large parts of the information (H5), and information search is not 
carried out by comparing gains and probabilities between gambles (H6).  
The results strengthen findings by Johnson et al. (2008) that individuals’ information search does 
not align with the predictions of the PH. In our experiment some methodological caveats of the 
experiments by Johnson et al. could be ruled out by three methodological modifications. First, 27 
we used an additional explicit screening instruction to allow individuals to quickly look at the 
available information and to estimate aspiration levels (cf. step 0 of the PH). This could make it 
easier to apply the PH. Second, we introduced a more clear-cut differentiation between the 
screening and decision phases, by asking people to click on the start button after screening the 
information. This circumvents the somewhat artificial split of information search used by John-
son et al. in a “reading phase” and a “choice phase,” based on individually observed data. John-
son et al. considered the information search to belong to a reading phase until all pieces of in-
formation were at least inspected once; thereafter, information search was considered to belong 
to the choice phase. If individuals, for instance, were not interested in one piece of information, 
all information search movements were considered to belong to the reading phase. Third, the 
application of the open mouselab method reduced the likelihood that the decision strategy would 
be influenced by the research method, as compared to the standard mouselab used by Johnson et 
al. (cf. Glöckner & Betsch, 2007). The convergence of the results of Experiment 3 with the re-
sults of Experiment 1 indicates that decision strategies were not severely influenced by the open 
mouselab method.   
However, taking a methodologically critical perspective, in our experiment we cannot rule out 
the possibility that participants did not obey the instructions and that information search did not 
correspond to the recorded mouse movements. Note, however, that the main focus of the study 
was to test the hypotheses derived by the PH, and (aside from converging evidence of choices 
and decision times) it seems rather unlikely that individuals first applied a frugal information 
search strategy and afterwards moved the mouse to all available pieces of information. Further-
more, we cannot rule out that the instruction to start decision making with a screening of all in-
formation induced exhaustive instead of limited information search and thus led to a rejection of 
H5. Note, however, that the high resemblance of choice data and decision times with Experiment 
1 speaks against a substantial influence of the additional instruction on choice behavior.        
General Discussion 
In this paper, we first discussed empirical findings concerning the Priority Heuristic that has 
been proposed as a fast-and-frugal heuristic for risky choices (Brandstätter et al., 2006) and came 
to the conclusion that the evidence was equivocal. A closer investigation of the simulations used 
by Brandstätter et al. (2006) led us to suspect that the major findings supporting the PH are based 
on two facts: first, that decision tasks used in the simulations were not diagnostic for the PH as 
compared to CPT; and second, that only aggregated choices were analyzed. Therefore, we se-
lected diagnostic decision tasks in our experiments and analyzed individual choices. We derived 
six specific hypotheses from the PH to conduct a critical empirical test of the model against CPT. 
All six hypotheses were rejected, and in all cases decision behavior was more aligned with the 
predictions of CPT than the PH. 
It was possible to demonstrate that aggregated choice data deviated significantly from the predic-
tions of the PH if diagnostic decision tasks are included. Particularly, the first PH hypothesis was   28
rejected, which proposed that the proportion of choices in line with the predictions of the PH 
should be approximately equal for different decision tasks. In contrast, it was found that choices 
were mainly in line with the PH for those categories of decision tasks in which the predictions of 
the PH were aligned with the predictions of CPT, whereas low proportions of choices aligned 
with the predictions of the PH if this was not the case. For instance, it could be shown that in the 
category of decision tasks in which CPT predicts a certainty effect but the PH predicts that the 
certainty effect should disappear (i.e., CERTCON), choice proportions in line with the PH were 
very low, whereas these proportions were very high in cases in which the predictions of CPT and 
the PH aligned (i.e., CERTPRO).  
The second PH hypothesis stated that individual choices can be best explained by the PH. In con-
trast to this hypothesis, it was found that for the majority of the participants individual choice 
patterns can be best explained by CPT (i.e., Exp. 1: 78%, Exp. 2: 69%). Only for a small minor-
ity of the participants (i.e., Exp. 1: 9%, Exp. 2: 5%) were individual choices roughly in line with 
the predictions of the PH. Overall, it was found that the predictive accuracy of the PH mainly 
depended on the overlap in choice predictions with CPT. We reduced this overlap by using diag-
nostic decision tasks and found that the predictive accuracy of the PH for individual choices 
dropped almost to the level of chance (i.e., Exp. 1: 59%, Exp. 2: 53%, Exp. 3: 60%).  
The third PH hypothesis stated that decision times should increase with an increasing number of 
reasons (i.e., steps) that have to be considered when applying the PH. This hypothesis also had to 
be rejected because decision time did not depend on this factor. In line with classic (Cartwright, 
1941; Cartwright & Festinger, 1943; Festinger, 1943a; 1943b) and more recent findings (Bergert 
& Nosofsky, 2007; Glöckner & Betsch, 2007; Glöckner, 2007), decision times seem to increase 
with the increase in the similarity of the expected utilities of the gambles. These findings conflict 
with the findings reported by Brandstätter et al. (2006). As discussed above, we suspect that the 
fact that Brandstätter et al. (2006) did not control for the similarity of expected utilities in their 
experiment could have caused the different results. 
The fourth PH hypothesis postulated that changes in minimum gains and probabilities of mini-
mum gains that are below or above reasonable aspiration levels (i.e., 1/10 and 1/3) should not 
influence choices. Based on the findings of Experiment 2, this hypothesis was also rejected. The 
manipulation of differences in minimum gains and probabilities of minimum gains influenced 
choice probabilities also outside of the considered aspiration levels. In line with the predictions 
of CPT, choice functions were descriptively more aligned with a linear than with a step function. 
Thus, overall, evidence indicated that the reasons postulated by the PH are not considered in a 
non-compensatory manner using aspiration levels. 
The fifth PH hypothesis was that information search should be frugal, in that a large part of the 
information should be ignored. Experiment 3 showed that this hypothesis is not supported by the 
data. In line with experiments on probabilistic inference tasks (Glöckner, 2006; Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2007; Newell, Weston, & Shanks, 2003; Newell & Shanks, 2003; cf. Bröder, 2003), on 29 
average individuals inspected all pieces of information at least once and did not truncate the in-
formation search according to the stopping rule proposed by the PH.  
The sixth PH hypothesis proposed that individuals should mainly search information by directly 
comparing gains and probabilities between gambles rather than by carrying out information 
search within each gamble. This hypothesis was also clearly rejected. In line with the predictions 
of CPT, information search was dominantly carried out within gambles and only a few transi-
tions between gambles were observed.  
In sum, the findings concerning all six hypotheses converge in showing that individuals do not 
apply the PH, and decision behavior concerning choices, decision times and information search 
can be better explained by CPT. In contrast to the provoking proposition by Brandstätter et al. 
(2006) – that individuals use gains and probabilities in risky decisions in a non-compensatory 
manner – the majority of individuals seem to make trade-offs between probabilities and gains as 
proposed by CPT. 
The results highlight one fundamental risk of the simulation methods often cited to support fast-
and-frugal heuristics (e.g., Czerlinsky, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996). As we tried to demonstrate in this paper, it could be easily misleading to argue that a fast-
and-frugal heuristic is a better model for individuals’ decision making than a more complex 
compensatory model merely based on the facts that (a) the heuristic is able to predict choices in a 
limited sample of decision tasks equally well and (b) that the decision strategy has fewer adjust-
able parameters and therefore receives more support than the more complex model (cf. Occam’s 
Razor argument; Brandstätter et al., 2006). A sound test of heuristics has to include sufficient 
diagnostic decision tasks that allow differentiation between decision strategies.   
The results reported in this paper are in line with recent findings in research on probabilistic de-
cision tasks that individuals have the computational capacity quickly to make decisions that ap-
proximate weighted additive information integration (Glöckner & Betsch, 2007) and even use 
this as a default strategy (Bröder, 2003). In Experiment 1, most of the participants integrated in-
formation in line with CPT within 5.5 seconds (on average). Note that the deliberate calculation 
of choices according to CPT would necessitate that the participants carry out two multiplications 
of probabilities and gains for each gamble, add the products up for each gamble and compare the 
sums. Considering the fact that many of the gains and probabilities were no simple multiples of 
10 or .10, it is rather unlikely that these calculations could have been carried out deliberately in 
such a short time. As outlined in more detail elsewhere (Glöckner & Betsch, in press; Glöckner, 
2007), we argue that individuals apply decision strategies that are based on automatic processes 
and are part of the intuitive system instead (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; cf. Epstein, 1990; 
Hogarth, 2001; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977; Sloman, 2002; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). We put forward that these automatic processes 
enable individuals in risky decisions and in probabilistic inference decisions to quickly come to   30
choices that approximate weighted compensatory information integration (cf. Hammond, Hamm, 
Grassia, & Pearson, 1987).
8 
Our results indicate that CPT is a well-suited paramorphic model (cf. Hoffman, 1960; also called 
“as-if model”; Brandstätter et al., 2006) that describes individuals’ choices in gambling decision 
tasks, even without fitting parameters to individually observed data. Nevertheless, we agree with 
Brandstätter et al. (2006) that there is a need for more precise process models. However, accord-
ing to our data, non-compensatory heuristics like the PH are not good candidates for explaining 
the processes underlying risky decisions. Considering the findings that individuals are able 
quickly to integrate information in a weighted compensatory manner and that decision time in-
creases with the increasing similarity of the expected utilities of the gambles, evidence accumu-
lation models (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Busemeyer & Johnson, 2004; Gold & Shadlen, 
2007; Lee & Cummins, 2005; Newell, 2005) and parallel constraint satisfaction network models 
(Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Glöckner, 2006; Glöckner & Betsch, in press; Simon, Krawczyk, & 
Holyoak, 2004; Thagard & Millgram, 1995) might be good candidates for explaining these proc-
esses. However, further research will be needed to improve our understanding of them. 
 
                                        
8  Converging evidence for this view is provided by research that shows that even lower animals that are not 
able to use deliberate processing  in decision making (i.e., sticklebacks), select mating partners based on a 
weighted compensatory information integration (Künzler & Bakker, 2001; see also Glimcher, Dorris, Bayer, 
2005, Real, 1991, and Glöckner, in press).  31 
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Appendix A 
Decision Tasks Experiment 1 and 3 
The following table shows the 40 decision tasks used in Experiments 1 and 3. Each decision task 
consists of two gambles A and B (columns), two possible outcomes (Out 1 and Out 2) and their 
probabilities (rows). The five main columns represent the different categories of decision task. 
For each category the eight different decision tasks are presented in the rows. The expected value 
for each pair of gambles is approximately the same. All gambles are coded, so that gamble A is 
predicted by the PH and, in each gamble, outcome 1 is lower than outcome 2. 3
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Appendix B 
The conditional likelihood Lk for a data set (individual set of choices) under the condition that a 
certain decision strategy k was applied with a constant error rate εk is given by 
) (
1
) 1 ( ) , (
jk j jk n n
k
n
k
J
j jk
j
k jk k n
n
k n p L
−
=
− ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
= = ∏ ε ε ε , 
with J being the total number of categories of decision tasks, nj being the number of choices in 
category j, and njk being the number of choices in line with the prediction of strategy k in cate-
gory j. The error rate εk for each decision strategy is estimated by  
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
÷
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
− = ∑ ∑
= =
J
j
j
J
j
jk j k n n n
1 1
) ( ˆ ε . 
For each participant, the conditional likelihoods Lk for all strategies were computed and the re-
sulting likelihood values were compared. Individuals were classified as users of a certain strat-
egy if the conditional likelihood for this strategy was higher than the conditional likelihood for 
the remaining strategies. Furthermore, it was necessary that the conditional likelihood of the best 
strategy was at least larger than the sum of the conditional likelihoods for the remaining strate-
gies. If this was not the case, classification was considered unreliable, and no classification was 
carried out. If the best strategy had an error rate larger than .50 (i.e., when the predictive accu-
racy was below chance level), no classification was carried out either. 
Appendix C 
Decisions Tasks Experiment 2 
Decision tasks in Experiment 2 were categorized in five sets (main rows). In each set, the gam-
bles A (left main column) were held constant. The gambles B were manipulated on six to twelve 
levels (right main column). Each of the columns depicts a version of gamble B that was paired 
with the respective fix gamble A of the set. All gambles have expected values of €100.  
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